# kaal:claim:3125827-003

**Claim.** A secure proof of stake protocol requires an incentive structure that perpetually motivates users to do three things at once: produce valuable blocks, police blocks that violate protocol, and improve the production protocols in response to gaming. Incentivizing only block production is insufficient.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- decentralized systems without a central enforcement authority

**Source quote.**

> A secure PoS protocol requires a proper incentive structure which perpetually motivates users to produce valuable blocks, to police the production of blocks which violate protocols, and to improve block production protocols in response to gaming.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Secure Proof of Stake Protocol* (2018), 1 Overview, page 3

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202018%20-%20Secure%20Proof%20of%20Stake%20Protocol.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, consensus-and-security, institutional-design

**Keywords.** incentive-design, proof-of-stake, policing, protocol-evolution, security

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-013

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.