# kaal:claim:3125827-007

**Claim.** Because at least half of the sem tokens minted when a user buys in with a fee are shared with the community that polices the application, the ability to purchase tokens does not open a profitable 51% attack; the authors claim a mathematical proof that this feature alone eliminates the incentive.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- token purchase mints tokens split with the existing community
- proof holds under the worst case assumptions of Appendix A.1

**Source quote.**

> at least half of the tokens minted are shared with the community who polices the application. We provide a mathematical proof that shows this alone completely eliminates all incentives to perform the 51% attack in Appendix A.1.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Secure Proof of Stake Protocol* (2018), 1 Overview, page 5

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202018%20-%20Secure%20Proof%20of%20Stake%20Protocol.pdf

**Topics.** consensus-and-security, tokenomics

**Keywords.** 51-percent-attack, token-minting, sem-tokens, griefing-factor, attack-cost

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.