# kaal:claim:3125827-012

**Claim.** No consensus protocol can guard against Byzantine faults when a single transaction is worth more than the promise of all future fees for the entire platform, because in that case a party can profitably bribe the whole node set to destroy the chain's own integrity.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- a single transaction whose value exceeds the present value of all future platform fees

**Source quote.**

> No protocol can guard against Byzantine faults if a transaction is more valuable than the promise of all future fees for the entire platform; in this case a party could bribe the entire set of nodes (or 51%)

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Secure Proof of Stake Protocol* (2018), 2.2 Soft attacks, page 8

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202018%20-%20Secure%20Proof%20of%20Stake%20Protocol.pdf

**Failure mode.** transaction-value-exceeds-fee-base  (family: token-transferability-defect)

**Topics.** consensus-and-security

**Keywords.** bribery-attack, byzantine-fault-tolerance, fee-structure, transaction-value, security-budget

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.