# kaal:claim:3125827-028

**Claim.** When a fork skips valid blocks, fees previously distributed to the bench from those blocks lose their valid histories and ownership reverts to the transaction authors, which creates a direct disincentive for validators to endorse such forks.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- a producer points to a block earlier than the previous time slot
- skipped blocks become orphans

**Source quote.**

> skipped blocks will no longer have valid histories in those skipped blocks, and so the fees' ownership will automatically revert to the authors of the transactions contained in the skipped blocks. This creates a disincentive for validating such forks.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Secure Proof of Stake Protocol* (2018), 5.2 Block production, page 19

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202018%20-%20Secure%20Proof%20of%20Stake%20Protocol.pdf

**Topics.** consensus-and-security, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** forks, fee-reversion, orphan-blocks, validation-incentives, chain-consensus

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.