# kaal:claim:3125827-029

**Claim.** If a Byzantine producer equivocates during a network partition and wins validation pools in separate subnets, the fork is not permanent: once connectivity is restored the next honest producer points to a previous block, and with 51% honest producers the Byzantine fork is eventually orphaned because honest producers outproduce it.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- at least 51% honest producers
- network connectivity is eventually restored

**Source quote.**

> The next honest producer would point to a previous block and all Byzantine forks would be invalidated. If there are 51% honest producers the Byzantine fork would eventually be orphaned, since honest producers will outproduce the Byzantine producers

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Secure Proof of Stake Protocol* (2018), 5.2 Block production, page 20

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202018%20-%20Secure%20Proof%20of%20Stake%20Protocol.pdf

**Topics.** consensus-and-security

**Keywords.** equivocation, network-partition, byzantine-fault-tolerance, blacklisting, fork-choice

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.