# kaal:claim:3125827-033

**Claim.** If the bench institutes protocols for rejecting applicants through the validation pool, it gains both the incentive and the opportunity to block all new users entirely, so that existing bench members keep sharing all the fees among themselves.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- bench adopts admission screening for new experts

**Source quote.**

> Unfortunately this gives the incentive and opportunity for existing experts to completely block all new users, so the existing bench members share all the fees.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Secure Proof of Stake Protocol* (2018), 6 Analysis, page 22

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202018%20-%20Secure%20Proof%20of%20Stake%20Protocol.pdf

**Failure mode.** incumbent-bench-closure  (family: governance-participation-collapse)

**Topics.** regulatory-failure, decentralization

**Keywords.** incumbent-capture, admission-control, validation-pool, rent-seeking, decentralization

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.