# kaal:claim:3125827-039

**Claim.** Because earlier sem tokens represent a larger percentage of the total and therefore pay out more, later experts have less motivation to join when fees are at a steady state; the authors propose that the bench may need to change the fee to token exchange rate to recruit new members.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- steady state rate of fees paid into the expertise
- tokens created with every fee and never destroyed

**Source quote.**

> This may mean later experts have less motivation to join if fees paid into the system are at a steady state. To combat this, the bench may choose to change the exchange rate between fees and sem tokens to encourage new recruits.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Secure Proof of Stake Protocol* (2018), A.2 Natural sem token inflation, page 34

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Secure Proof of Stake Protocol (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125827

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `598d9bd95e4af7a0a35328677c6bfc069f69f2e32c30c720b3a0be98a23a40cb` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202018%20-%20Secure%20Proof%20of%20Stake%20Protocol.pdf

**Failure mode.** late-entrant-disincentive  (family: staking-and-incentive-misalignment)

**Topics.** tokenomics, governance-design

**Keywords.** early-mover-advantage, recruitment, token-inflation, sem-tokens, governance-parameters

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125822-027

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.