# kaal:claim:3128900-026

**Claim.** Reputation scores clear the market on both sides: a low requester score makes workers less likely to accept that requester's offers, and a low worker score reduces the worker's likelihood of retention.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- two sided reputation scoring visible to both parties

**Source quote.**

> If requesters have a lower reputation score, workers become less likely to accept requesters' offers. In turn, low reputation scores for micro task workers result in a lower likelihood of retention for micro task work on the Semada Network.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation* (2018), 3.3 Reputation Score, page 13

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `381d72e85d976e2af852e8ec3bba87bc6a05ccb3349a2c3dd6f9e64de96ab4b0` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202018%20-%20Decentralized%20Mechanical%20Turk%20Through%20Verified%20Reputation.pdf

**Topics.** reputation, economics, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** reputation-score, market-equilibrium, two-sided-market, incentive-design

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4734750-037
- generalizes: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4755632-036

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.