# kaal:claim:3128900-027

**Claim.** Because requesters select workers by reputation score, workers acquire an incentive to keep their scores high by performing tasks with high accuracy and efficiency.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- requesters can observe and select on reputation score

**Source quote.**

> Requesters can select workers based on their reputation score, giving workers an incentive to keep the reputation scores high by performing micro tasks with high accuracy and efficiency.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation* (2018), 3.3 Reputation Score, page 13

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Mechanical Turk Through Verified Reputation (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128900

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `381d72e85d976e2af852e8ec3bba87bc6a05ccb3349a2c3dd6f9e64de96ab4b0` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202018%20-%20Decentralized%20Mechanical%20Turk%20Through%20Verified%20Reputation.pdf

**Topics.** reputation, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** reputation-score, worker-incentives, quality-control, selection

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.