# kaal:claim:3227967-006

**Claim.** In early Silicon Valley the contractual mechanisms lawyers designed, together with the lawyer dominated market for reputation, reduced information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors and were necessary to bring the demand and supply sides of venture capital together effectively.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- venture capital markets with young and inexperienced entrepreneurs
- Silicon Valley from the early 1970s

**Source quote.**

> Finally, the contractual mechanisms and the lawyer-dominated market for reputation reduced the information asymmetries between the entrepreneurs and investors and, as such, were necessary to bring the demand-side and supply-side of "venture capital" together effectively.

**From.** Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, *Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters* (2018), III. Lawyers as Transaction Engineers, page 11

**Cite as.** Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age Why 'Coding for Lawyers' Matters (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227967

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `f6e13b956f864ab32ec3305d095a35a127770327d75b3688f785cefc437d369f` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Fenwick%20et%20al.%20-%202018%20-%20Legal%20Education%20in%20a%20Digital%20Age%20Why%20%27Coding%20for%20Lawyers%27%20Matters.pdf

**Topics.** innovation, disclosure, securities-law

**Keywords.** venture-capital, transaction-engineers, information-asymmetry, silicon-valley

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.