# kaal:claim:3249860-001

**Claim.** Crypto-economic incentive design is only limitedly successful at shaping future human behavior, because the designer must speculate about future human mental states and belief systems that may turn out entirely different from what was anticipated.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- designs that rely on assumptions about human reactions to economic incentives

**Source quote.**

> Shaping future human behavior through incentive design is limitedly successful7 because the social engineer speculates about human future mental states and corresponding belief systems.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared* (2018), I. Introduction, page 4

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto Economics - The Top 100 Token Models Compared (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `72b13f11002ba26206cd53e74c324b913d1830c642bfa024da6bac0d3af3a7b0` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202018%20-%20Crypto%20Economics%20-%20The%20Top%20100%20Token%20Models%20Compared.pdf

**Failure mode.** speculative-incentive-design  (family: staking-and-incentive-misalignment)

**Topics.** economics, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** crypto-economics, incentive-design, behavioral-limits, social-engineering

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3606663-022

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.