# kaal:claim:3266953-029

**Claim.** Identity verification does not fix the sockpuppet problem, because whenever the reputation is genuinely valuable a sockpuppet operator can afford to clear whatever verification hoops are in place, including stealing biometric data, and then inflate reputation as before.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- reputation that carries real economic value

**Source quote.**

> The problem with this is, if the reputation is genuinely valuable, a sockpuppet account can afford to go through whatever hoops you have in place to create false identities (including stealing biometric data if necessary), then increase their reputation arbitrarily, as described above.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, *Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper* (2018), Sockpuppet Protocol, page 21

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `781758dea356e55d79c73ad7f1debe7c83de398bd1cd9e0a9a6c2802f276b4c0` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20et%20al.%20-%202018%20-%20Reputation%20Protocol%20for%20the%20Internet%20of%20Trust%20-%20Conceptual%20Whitepaper.pdf

**Failure mode.** identity verification does not deter valuable sockpuppets  (family: sybil-and-identity-attack)

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** identity-verification, sockpuppet, biometrics, remedy-failure

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3128900-045

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.