# kaal:claim:3266953-035

**Claim.** The Sockpuppet Protocol breaks the incentive for Sybil attacks because all power derives from validation pools in relation to what members stake and all fungible currency rewards are shared with the group in proportion to individual reputation.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- reward changes occur only through validation pools

**Source quote.**

> All power comes from validation pools in relation to what DAO members stake, and all fungible currency rewards are shared fairly with the group in proportion to their individual reputation. The Sockpuppet Protocol thus breaks the incentives for Sybil attacks.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, *Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper* (2018), Sockpuppet Protocol, page 22

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Gopinath Sivalingam, Reputation Protocol for the Internet of Trust - Conceptual Whitepaper (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266953

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `781758dea356e55d79c73ad7f1debe7c83de398bd1cd9e0a9a6c2802f276b4c0` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20et%20al.%20-%202018%20-%20Reputation%20Protocol%20for%20the%20Internet%20of%20Trust%20-%20Conceptual%20Whitepaper.pdf

**Topics.** consensus-and-security

**Keywords.** sockpuppet-protocol, sybil-resistance, validation-pool, reward-sharing

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