# kaal:claim:3373393-003

**Claim.** The core agency conflicts that emanate from the separation of ownership by shareholder principals and control by manager agents cannot be fully addressed by the existing theoretical and legal framework, because monitoring agents is inevitably costly and transaction costs abound.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- under the existing theoretical and legal framework for corporate governance

**Source quote.**

> However, the core agency conflicts emanating from the separation of ownership (shareholder principal) and control (manager agent) cannot be fully addressed by the existing theoretical and legal framework.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance* (2019), I. Introduction, page 3

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Solutions for Agency Problems in Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373393

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `4d1424b9ba9aff8a61bc7a0dddd02cded93785e5843685dde76c07dcdb23961e` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202019%20-%20Blockchain%20Solutions%20for%20Agency%20Problems%20in%20Corporate%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** irreducible-agency-conflict  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** compliance, governance-design, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** agency-theory, separation-of-ownership-and-control, monitoring-costs, corporate-governance

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808852-010

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.