# kaal:claim:3396522-023

**Claim.** Central bank price stability is elusive for two structural reasons: central banks are constantly lobbied to move money supply away from equilibrium, and even absent lobbying they face information asymmetries that prevent them from determining the optimal supply at any given moment.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> Central banks are constantly being lobbied to increase or decrease money supply away from equilibrium.149 Moreover, even without lobbying, Central banks are subject to information asymmetries that do not allow them to determine the optimal amount of supply at any given point in time.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, *Stable Cryptocurrencies* (2019), IV. Stable Cryptocurrencies, 7. Price Stability, page 37

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3396522

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ef5031b16aa53476ed618f0bdf92601cd4affb893692c701134bd9cba3ea8acf` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20et%20al.%20-%202019%20-%20Stable%20Cryptocurrencies.pdf

**Failure mode.** central-bank-supply-determination-failure  (family: valuation-and-pricing-failure)

**Topics.** systemic-risk, economics, disclosure, tokenomics

**Keywords.** central-banks, price-stability, lobbying, information-asymmetry, monetary-policy

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