# kaal:claim:3402701-010

**Claim.** Distributing newly minted coins to shareholders, as Basis planned, is exploitable: shareholders can collude to hold their new money and drive the price up, which triggers further minting that benefits the colluders.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- new supply distributed to an identifiable shareholder group

**Source quote.**

> However, it is possible the shareholders would collude to drive the price up by holding their new money

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, *Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles* (2019), 3.1.1 Minting, page 16

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vadhindran K. Rao, Stable Cryptocurrencies - First Order Principles (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `72ed2581b4cac2bd18a5b2640be959487a3cbc34c86ab5e5664924bcdb53c8e0` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20et%20al.%20-%202019%20-%20Stable%20Cryptocurrencies%20-%20First%20Order%20Principles.pdf

**Failure mode.** shareholder-collusion-on-minting  (family: staking-and-incentive-misalignment)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** minting, collusion, basis, incentive-design

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.
