# kaal:claim:3405660-025

**Claim.** Competition among creditor banks undermines indirect regulation, because competing banks compromise on important elements of the risk management process and agree to overly generous credit conditions.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- multiple banks competing to lend to the same hedge funds

**Source quote.**

> Competition among creditor banks can also lead to compromising on important elements of the risk management process and agreeing to overly generous credit conditions.

**From.** Kaal, *Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds* (2019), IV. Indirect Regulation, page 19

**Cite as.** Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `cf507b1833071765bc13a5605f38c2591582eca85f40869e38b6ff075c04d29d` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202019%20-%20Indirect%20Regulation%20of%20Hedge%20Funds.pdf

**Failure mode.** creditor competition erosion  (family: supervisory-capacity-gap)

**Topics.** economics, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** creditor-competition, credit-standards, indirect-regulation, risk-management

**Related claims.**

- supports: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-028

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.