# kaal:claim:3405660-035

**Claim.** Indirect regulation makes ex post opportunism by hedge funds less likely because the financial intermediaries, not just the funds, stand to lose reputation and market position if their counterparty risk evaluation proves insufficient.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- intermediaries face reputational exposure in the market

**Source quote.**

> ex post opportunism of hedge funds is less likely considering that not only hedge funds but also their financial intermediaries are endangered to lose their reputation and market position in case it transpired that their risk evaluation of a counterparty hedge fund is insufficient

**From.** Kaal, *Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds* (2019), V. Conclusion, page 25

**Cite as.** Kaal, Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds (2019). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405660

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `cf507b1833071765bc13a5605f38c2591582eca85f40869e38b6ff075c04d29d` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202019%20-%20Indirect%20Regulation%20of%20Hedge%20Funds.pdf

**Topics.** reputation, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** reputation, ex-post-opportunism, counterparty-risk, indirect-regulation

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