# kaal:claim:3406323-040

**Claim.** For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes there is a way to subvert the rules for individual profit at the expense of the group, a result the author attributes to the Folk Theorems of game theory.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- infinitely repeated games using reputation or stakes
- static rule sets

**Source quote.**

> For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation (stakes), there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy* (2019), VII. Ethical Governance, page 19

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - A Primer on the New Economy (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406323

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `6293780b57a1ae1de17ec00f99cc94295d4f72ea4d08b17a5c08c44772b221db` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202019%20-%20Decentralization%20-%20A%20Primer%20on%20the%20New%20Economy.pdf

**Failure mode.** static-rule-subversion  (family: rule-obsolescence-and-ossification)

**Topics.** economics, consensus-and-security, reputation, governance-design

**Keywords.** game-theory, folk-theorems, system-attacks, reputation, governance

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3411897-040
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-011
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-011
- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782192-017
- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-036
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782220-004
- supports: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3402701-007

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.