# kaal:claim:3411897-040

**Claim.** For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation stakes, there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group, which is why static decentralized governance rules can always be gamed and only dynamic, changing rules can address the problem.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- infinitely repeated games with reputation or stake based rules
- static rule sets

**Source quote.**

> For any static set of rules in an infinitely repeated game using reputation (stakes), there is a way to subvert the rules for an individual's profit at the expense of the group.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future* (2019), Part 3: The Future, Responsible Decentralization, page 45

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralization - Past, Present, and Future (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411897

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `82f0aea026b3e3a526ec51bc073b3b864dc06cd9083ff9c54c550037045edaa9` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202019%20-%20Decentralization%20-%20Past%2C%20Present%2C%20and%20Future.pdf

**Failure mode.** static-rules-are-gameable  (family: rule-obsolescence-and-ossification)

**Topics.** economics, governance-design, consensus-and-security, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** game-theory, governance, system-attacks, incentive-design

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-040
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3406323-041
- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-005

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.