# kaal:claim:3441904-005

**Claim.** Forking a chain is an insufficient governance mechanism, and even attempts to create socially optimal chain forking rules cannot suffice as a substitute for evolutionary blockchain governance protocols.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- existing blockchain governance that relies on forks

**Source quote.**

> Existing blockchain governance still mainly consist of forking a given chain. Even attempts to create socially optimal chain forking rules cannot suffice.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance* (2019), I. Introduction, page 7

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202019%20-%20Blockchain-Based%20Corporate%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** forking-as-governance  (family: governance-participation-collapse)

**Topics.** consensus-and-security, blockchain, governance-design, dao

**Keywords.** forking, blockchain-governance, protocol-upgrade, dao

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-039
- supported_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782203-010

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.