# kaal:claim:3441904-010

**Claim.** Dynamic power organization in a DAO succeeds only if the decentralized governance structure motivates token holders to collaborate productively by fairly rewarding development, work, and the policing of any diminishments.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- DAO designs that distribute autonomous power to members

**Source quote.**

> The successful implementation of such dynamic power organization requires a decentralized governance structure that motivates DAO token holders to collaborate productively, by fairly rewarding development, work, and the policing of any diminishments.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance* (2019), II.1 Distinguishing Features of Decentralized Systems, page 9

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202019%20-%20Blockchain-Based%20Corporate%20Governance.pdf

**Topics.** dao, ai-and-agents, risk-and-incentives, governance-design

**Keywords.** dao, incentive-alignment, governance-design, collaboration

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3373393-031
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4067783-019

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.