# kaal:claim:3441904-014

**Claim.** The core governance failure of the original 2016 DAO was its inability to create dynamic governance protocol upgrades in real time through dynamic feedback loops, because its voting structure was built for investment proposals rather than governance design.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- the original 2016 DAO
- flaws materializing in already deployed code

**Source quote.**

> The core governance failure illustrated by the 2016 DAO is its failure to create dynamic governance protocol upgrades in real-time through dynamic feedback loops.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance* (2019), III.1 Centralized Design Elements in the Original 2016 DAO, page 13

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain-Based Corporate Governance (2019). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441904

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e6b562527f7f19accaa35491db0a0db168b6a936755e1dca424e9f30bee7a815` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202019%20-%20Blockchain-Based%20Corporate%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** no-real-time-governance-upgrade  (family: smart-contract-rigidity)

**Topics.** dao, governance-design

**Keywords.** dao-hack, protocol-upgrade, voting-design, dynamic-governance

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.