# kaal:claim:3652481-019

**Claim.** Overcoming attempts by rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game a DAO's governance design requires a duality of incentives, in which actors improve their own utility while their actions simultaneously benefit the whole institution over the long run.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> Human nature and any effective machine derivates of human engagements in institutional form require a duality of incentives in order to overcome attempts of rational and opportunistic internal and external constituents to game the governance design of a given DAO.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design* (2020), III.3 Suboptimal Incentive Design, page 29

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `530b3a40c244aeca2eb4c53f4c9b4d6b2962bd6be9f92b4ebe17139c17f4c0e0` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202020%20-%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organizations%20%E2%80%93%20Internal%20Governance%20and%20External%20Legal%20Design.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, regulatory-failure, dao, governance-design

**Keywords.** duality-of-incentives, gaming, incentive-design, dao-governance

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-037
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-013
- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-018
- generalizes: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-014

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.