# kaal:claim:3652481-020

**Claim.** DAO designs at the beginning of the 2020s did not effectively master the duality of incentives that a workable DAO governance design requires.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** asserted

**Holds when.**

- DAO designs as of the early 2020s

**Source quote.**

> DAO designs at the beginning of the 2020s did not effectively master this duality.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design* (2020), III.3 Suboptimal Incentive Design, page 29

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `530b3a40c244aeca2eb4c53f4c9b4d6b2962bd6be9f92b4ebe17139c17f4c0e0` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202020%20-%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organizations%20%E2%80%93%20Internal%20Governance%20and%20External%20Legal%20Design.pdf

**Failure mode.** unmastered incentive duality  (family: staking-and-incentive-misalignment)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, dao

**Keywords.** incentive-design, non-fungible-assets, corruption, dao-limitations

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-038

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.