# kaal:claim:3652481-026

**Claim.** Stable and presumptively optimal static or constitutional rules for DAO governance typically enable gaming and arbitrage opportunities, because rational opportunistic parties will circumvent complex static rules to increase their share of power and profit.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- the system is open and democratic
- the rule set is static and complex

**Source quote.**

> Stable and presumptively optimal static and/or constitutional rules for DAO governance therefore typically enable gaming and arbitrage opportunities.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design* (2020), IV.1.a Dynamic Elements, page 35

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `530b3a40c244aeca2eb4c53f4c9b4d6b2962bd6be9f92b4ebe17139c17f4c0e0` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202020%20-%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organizations%20%E2%80%93%20Internal%20Governance%20and%20External%20Legal%20Design.pdf

**Failure mode.** static rule gaming  (family: rule-obsolescence-and-ossification)

**Topics.** regulatory-failure, governance-design

**Keywords.** static-rules, gaming, arbitrage, governance-design

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-025
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-035

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.