# kaal:claim:3652481-030

**Claim.** The one token one vote designs popular in the early 2020s produced suboptimal voting outcomes because they allocate more power to holders of a large share of total token supply, leaving majority holders more powerful than all remaining holders combined.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- one token one vote voting mechanisms

**Source quote.**

> Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols were associated with the then popular one-token-one-vote voting mechanisms. A one- token-one-vote design allocates more power to token holders who have a significant share of the total supply of a given token.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design* (2020), IV.1.b On-Chain Governance, page 38

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations – Internal Governance and External Legal Design (2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3652481

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `530b3a40c244aeca2eb4c53f4c9b4d6b2962bd6be9f92b4ebe17139c17f4c0e0` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202020%20-%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organizations%20%E2%80%93%20Internal%20Governance%20and%20External%20Legal%20Design.pdf

**Failure mode.** token plutocracy  (family: short-termism)

**Topics.** tokenomics, governance-design

**Keywords.** one-token-one-vote, plutocracy, voting-design, token-governance

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3799320-027
- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-039
- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-021
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-028

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.