# kaal:claim:3782193-038

**Claim.** When the executive branch is given more centralizing power during a crisis, or simply takes it, the mechanism for removing that power once the threat has passed has rarely been followed.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- crisis conditions such as war
- U.S. constitutional practice

**Source quote.**

> When the executive branch is given more centralizing power during a crisis, or simply takes it, the mechanism for removing that power when the threat is over has rarely been followed.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization* (2021), The U.S. Constitution’s dynamic hybrid solution, page 33

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Historical Sketches of Centralization vs. Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782193

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `74df9cc9a19a098bdacd0424a4174795f6e184f7a31c8ee7541195186701ebd2` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Historical%20Sketches%20of%20Centralization%20vs.%20Decentralization.pdf

**Failure mode.** Emergency power ratchet  (family: recentralization-drift)

**Topics.** decentralization, governance-design

**Keywords.** executive-power, emergency-powers, checks-and-balances, centralization, constitutional-design

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