# kaal:claim:3782198-003

**Claim.** The social media coordination function remains largely flawed and corruptible because the incentive design underlying social proof is suboptimal.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- applies to platform ratings, reviews, and social proof mechanisms under centralized ownership

**Source quote.**

> However, because the incentive design for social proof is suboptimal, the social media coordination function is still largely flawed and corruptible.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Contemporary Decentralization* (2021), From Social Media to Decentralized Coordination, page 5

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Contemporary Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782198

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e7e1378e3eed06cace6534e7792a7307d607d18bc6beb4ac45896476280728e4` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Contemporary%20Decentralization.pdf

**Failure mode.** corruptible-social-proof  (family: reputation-system-gaming)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, institutional-design

**Keywords.** incentive-design, social-proof, social-media, coordination-failure

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-008

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.