# kaal:claim:3782201-017

**Claim.** Human middlemen have an incentive not to entirely eliminate the corruption they are paid to overcome, which is one reason they become falsely identified with the friction itself.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> These middlemen are paid to overcome these corruptions and frictions. Unfortunately, they have an incentive to not entirely eliminate the corrup- tion.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Future of Decentralization* (2021), The fallacy of Uniformitarianism and Chesterton’s fence, page 21

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Future of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782201

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `bedf7bcfbb7a9b0112b5848cb0d941b1d41f330dafeee0143a30ff5e8aa53700` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Future%20of%20Decentralization.pdf

**Failure mode.** intermediary perverse incentive  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, institutional-design

**Keywords.** intermediaries, perverse-incentives, corruption, institutions

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