# kaal:claim:3782203-010

**Claim.** Because a group sometimes genuinely has no consensus to be discovered, network forking is at times inevitable rather than a governance failure that better rules could prevent.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- cyclic or irreconcilable group preferences
- decentralized networks whose members can exit

**Source quote.**

> First, that is a major problem for democracy. Sometimes there is no consensus to be had. This leads to the second conclusion that sometimes network forking is inevitable.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *A Technical Perspective on Decentralization* (2021), Application to network forking, page 6

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20A%20Technical%20Perspective%20on%20Decentralization.pdf

**Failure mode.** inevitable-fork  (family: collective-action-and-coordination-failure)

**Topics.** consensus-and-security, blockchain, governance-design

**Keywords.** network-forking, consensus, condorcet-paradox, blockchain-governance

**Related claims.**

- supports: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-005

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.