# kaal:claim:3782203-012

**Claim.** Given a process with static rules and finite, discrete execution, a sufficiently patient and clever minority can always corrupt the process and profit at the majority's expense while following the rules, so no perfect voting system exists.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- static rules
- finite discrete execution
- three or more options

**Source quote.**

> A sufficiently patient and clever minority power can always corrupt the process and profit at the expense of the majority, assuming your process has static rules and finite, discrete execution. There is no perfect voting system.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *A Technical Perspective on Decentralization* (2021), Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, page 8

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20A%20Technical%20Perspective%20on%20Decentralization.pdf

**Failure mode.** strategic-manipulation-of-static-rules  (family: rule-obsolescence-and-ossification)

**Topics.** governance-design, regulatory-failure

**Keywords.** arrow-impossibility-theorem, strategic-voting, minority-capture, governance-failure

**Related claims.**

- generalizes: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-005

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.