# kaal:claim:3782203-016

**Claim.** The efficiency gain from cooperation in repeated games can only be achieved if a policeable reputation system exists: players must have histories and those histories must be available to other players, which makes transparency and communication essential to effective policing.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- repeated games
- grim trigger or similar punishment strategies

**Source quote.**

> This new leap in efficiency as the players cooperate can only be achieved if there is the possibility of creating a policeable reputational system. The players must have a history, and that history must be available to the other players.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *A Technical Perspective on Decentralization* (2021), Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, page 12

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20A%20Technical%20Perspective%20on%20Decentralization.pdf

**Topics.** reputation, disclosure

**Keywords.** reputation-systems, repeated-games, transparency, policing, cooperation

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