# kaal:claim:3782203-019

**Claim.** Allowing periodic opportunities for renegotiation lets players escape the grim trigger trap, but it does not improve outcomes overall because it creates new incentives to defect and then gamble on talking one's way out of the punishment.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- repeated games with renegotiation windows

**Source quote.**

> Or if you allow periodic opportunities for renegotiation, then you might be able to get out of a grim trigger trap. This sounds like it would improve outcomes, but in fact it gives new opportunities for defecting/cheating.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *A Technical Perspective on Decentralization* (2021), Infinite variations of Prisoner’s Dilemma, page 13

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20A%20Technical%20Perspective%20on%20Decentralization.pdf

**Failure mode.** renegotiation-loophole  (family: collective-action-and-coordination-failure)

**Topics.** contingent-capital, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** renegotiation, grim-trigger, defection, unintended-incentives

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