# kaal:claim:3782203-020

**Claim.** For any game, a new assumption can be added that generalizes the game so that the previous winning strategy becomes a losing strategy and a new winning strategy arises; the authors offer this as a meta-theorem that cannot itself be formalized.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- any formal game model
- actors free to change their behavior and desires

**Source quote.**

> No matter which game you are playing, you can add a new assumption to make a more complicated generalization of the game, so that the previous winning strategy becomes a losing strategy, and a new winning strategy arises.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *A Technical Perspective on Decentralization* (2021), Infinite variations of Prisoner’s Dilemma, page 15

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20A%20Technical%20Perspective%20on%20Decentralization.pdf

**Failure mode.** assumption-escape  (family: research-design-limitation)

**Topics.** economics

**Keywords.** meta-theorem, nash-equilibrium-instability, game-theory, model-limits

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.