# kaal:claim:3782203-032

**Claim.** Cooperation is sustained only when the promise of future profits outweighs the present value of defecting, so a discount factor that is too low, or a game known to be ending soon, makes defection the rational choice.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- repeated games with end periods
- impatient players or high discounting

**Source quote.**

> Therefore, the promise of future profits must outweigh the present value to en- sure cooperation.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *A Technical Perspective on Decentralization* (2021), Application to reputation tokens, page 20

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20A%20Technical%20Perspective%20on%20Decentralization.pdf

**Failure mode.** end-period-defection  (family: collective-action-and-coordination-failure)

**Topics.** reputation, tokenomics

**Keywords.** discount-factor, end-period-problem, cooperation, reputation-tokens

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782214-024

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.