# kaal:claim:3782203-037

**Claim.** Automating exclusion of cheaters through smart contracts makes punishment credible and removes the infinite regress of traditional enforcement, where members would have to police those who failed to police those who failed to police cheaters.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- DAOs where contract allocation is algorithmic
- reputation thresholds enforced in code

**Source quote.**

> Algorithms can be written which exclude members who cheat from hav- ing access to their market. Punishment for cheating becomes automated and there- fore credible. Free riding in policing can at least partly be eliminated by automation.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *A Technical Perspective on Decentralization* (2021), Application to reputation tokens, page 21

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20A%20Technical%20Perspective%20on%20Decentralization.pdf

**Topics.** compliance, smart-contracts

**Keywords.** automated-punishment, credible-threats, free-riding, compliance, smart-contracts

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-035
- supported_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/6269518-016

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.