# kaal:claim:3782203-039

**Claim.** Because the Folk Theorems rule out a perfect reward system, the design goal for a DAO should be reduced to making it easier for members to help the group than to hurt it, with members themselves incentivized to police bad actors to protect their own profits.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- leaderless DAOs with anonymous members
- no external enforcement available

**Source quote.**

> From the Folk Theorems, we know we cannot set up a perfect system. The best we can hope for, is to design a system which makes it easier to help the group than to hurt it.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *A Technical Perspective on Decentralization* (2021), How to build a DAO, page 22

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, A Technical Perspective on Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782203

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ab8a22d0dbb026a09212a4c85963f3c05787cf80775e8613ae3724e3883e7a56` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20A%20Technical%20Perspective%20on%20Decentralization.pdf

**Topics.** dao, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** dao-design, folk-theorems, incentive-design, peer-policing

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.