# kaal:claim:3782205-016

**Claim.** If an organization's goal is to maintain decentralization, its tools must be used deliberately to prevent the natural concentration of power that occurs when economic inefficiencies create pockets of corruption where rent-seeking actors accumulate.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- assumes maintaining decentralization is the organization's goal

**Source quote.**

> If, however, the goal of the organization is to maintain decentralization (assuming that is preferable), then these tools must be used wisely to prevent the natural concentration of power that occurs when inefficiencies in the economy allow pockets of corruption to accumulate rent-seeking actors.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization* (2021), Chapter 9. Eight institutions, page 3

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Eight Institutions for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782205

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `5ba52c63e81019b6867fb29c4a50821ff574e510d79b31b8ce9f4c726a0ebc71` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Eight%20Institutions%20for%20the%20Evolution%20of%20Decentralization.pdf

**Failure mode.** Rent-seeking accumulation in inefficiency pockets  (family: recentralization-drift)

**Topics.** decentralization, economics

**Keywords.** rent-seeking, power-concentration, corruption, decentralization, inefficiency

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