# kaal:claim:3782210-009

**Claim.** Charging transaction fees or imposing KYC identity protocols does not solve the sockpuppet problem: such defenses push the cost of defending the network onto users, and the defense cost equals what it is worth to break the defense while being multiplied across every transaction with every member.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- defenses that tax ordinary transactions
- attacker gain from faked reputation exceeds the cost of faking it

**Source quote.**

> This doesn't help. Such defenses push the cost of defending the network onto the users. The cost to defend it is exactly as much as it is worth to break the defense, except it's multiplied on every transaction with every member in the system.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization* (2021), Web of Trust, page 4

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9cc531ab239f6266c8aeddcc8e54f4c06029c44e825444bee137bbcc0c9d0a8e` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20The%20Importance%20of%20Reputation%20for%20the%20Evolution%20of%20Decentralization.pdf

**Failure mode.** Fee and KYC pseudo-defense  (family: sybil-and-identity-attack)

**Topics.** compliance, consensus-and-security

**Keywords.** kyc, transaction-fees, sockpuppet-attack, defense-costs, security

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.
