# kaal:claim:3782210-033

**Claim.** One-person-one-vote governance fails on technical questions because half the members have less than average expertise yet equal power, which incentivizes experts to gain power by catering to less expert prejudices instead of pursuing the most effective decisions.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- organizations voting on matters requiring expertise

**Source quote.**

> Under a one-person-one-vote system, half of the mem- bers have less than average expertise, but equal power. This incentivizes experts to gain power by catering to less expert prejudices instead of following the most effective decisions.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization* (2021), Security, page 11

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, The Importance of Reputation for the Evolution of Decentralization (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782210

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9cc531ab239f6266c8aeddcc8e54f4c06029c44e825444bee137bbcc0c9d0a8e` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20The%20Importance%20of%20Reputation%20for%20the%20Evolution%20of%20Decentralization.pdf

**Failure mode.** Egalitarian voting expertise deficit  (family: governance-participation-collapse)

**Topics.** governance-design

**Keywords.** one-person-one-vote, expertise, tyranny-of-the-majority, governance

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/4529715-018

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.