# kaal:claim:3782214-008

**Claim.** Fundamental rule changes in a large decentralized organization are typically demanded when a large minority is treated unfairly, which means the advantaged majority has no incentive to make the change; the resulting deadlock leaves revolution or a network split as the only route to foundational change.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- large decentralized organizations
- rules that advantage the majority

**Source quote.**

> When a large decentralized organization needs a fundamental rule change, it of- ten happens because a large minority subgroup is being treated unfairly. That typically means the majority is advantaged by the rules and are therefore not incentivized to change the rules.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralized Governance* (2021), Chapter 6. Governance, page 5

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ba892bb200c1455447c0014f5067a501a93ea9ec413c31942d95952eb3bdfd9d` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Decentralized%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** majority lock in  (family: governance-participation-collapse)

**Topics.** consensus-and-security, governance-design

**Keywords.** majority-rule, minority-protection, forking, constitutional-amendment

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-017

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.