# kaal:claim:3782214-023

**Claim.** A reputational system formally linked to profits makes members forward thinking and cooperative, counteracting the tendency of competition to separate them, and it also motivates members to self police their own past investments.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- reputation is formally tied to the organization's profit stream

**Source quote.**

> A reputational system that is formally linked to profits makes the members for- ward-thinking and cooperative, to combat the natural tendency of competition to sep- arate members. It also motivates members to self-police their past investments.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralized Governance* (2021), Reputation counters instability from profit motive, page 10

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ba892bb200c1455447c0014f5067a501a93ea9ec413c31942d95952eb3bdfd9d` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Decentralized%20Governance.pdf

**Topics.** reputation, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** reputation, self-policing, incentive-design, cooperation

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