# kaal:claim:3782214-026

**Claim.** The alternatives to a reputational system for countering profit driven instability, namely external stabilizing forces such as governmental fiat and rapidly expanding profit opportunities, are inadequate because expansion driven stability lasts only as long as the expansion does.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- organizations destabilized by profit competition

**Source quote.**

> Alternatives to reputational systems for countering the instability generated by profit competition include external stabilizing forces (such as governmental fiat) or rapidly expanding profit opportunities (which will only stabilize a group until the ex- pansion stops).

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralized Governance* (2021), Reputation counters instability from profit motive, page 12

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ba892bb200c1455447c0014f5067a501a93ea9ec413c31942d95952eb3bdfd9d` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Decentralized%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** expansion dependent stability  (family: staking-and-incentive-misalignment)

**Topics.** reputation, governance-design

**Keywords.** reputation, network-stability, profit-motive, governance-alternatives

**Related claims.**

- supports: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-007
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782193-028

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.