# kaal:claim:3782214-029

**Claim.** If unanimous consensus is strongly incentivized in every validation pool, a DAO will degenerate quickly, because members holding minority opinions will not raise alternatives for fear of losing all their reputation tokens; this is why loosely coupled votes are needed.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- contentious protocol development
- validation pools that penalize minority positions

**Source quote.**

> If unanimous consen- sus is strongly incentivized by every validation pool, our DAOs will degenerate quickly, as alternative options will not be raised by members with minority opinions for fear they will lose all reputation tokens.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralized Governance* (2021), Legislative long-term governance with deliberative soft protocols, page 15

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ba892bb200c1455447c0014f5067a501a93ea9ec413c31942d95952eb3bdfd9d` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Decentralized%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** unanimity chilling effect  (family: innovation-chilling)

**Topics.** governance-design

**Keywords.** validation-pools, loosely-coupled-votes, deliberation, minority-opinions

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3962614-042
- supports: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782210-037

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.