# kaal:claim:3782214-037

**Claim.** Without the ability to hold representatives to account, representatives are not incentivized to vote for outcomes reflecting their constituency's wishes and needs, but instead promote agendas that serve their personal interests and preserve their own power.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- modern societies where voters do not know their representatives personally

**Source quote.**

> Without the ability to hold them to account, representatives are not incentivized to vote for outcomes that reflect the presumptive wishes and needs of their larger constituency, but for promoting the agendas which benefit their per- sonal interests and maintaining their own power.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, *Decentralized Governance* (2021), Microdemocracy, page 28

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Decentralized Governance (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782214

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `ba892bb200c1455447c0014f5067a501a93ea9ec413c31942d95952eb3bdfd9d` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20and%20Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20Decentralized%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** unaccountable delegation  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** governance-design

**Keywords.** representative-democracy, accountability, delegation, corruption

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808867-013

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.