# kaal:claim:3799320-027

**Claim.** Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols trace to one token one vote mechanisms, which allocate more power to holders of a significant share of total token supply.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- one token one vote governance designs

**Source quote.**

> Suboptimal voting outcomes in existing decentralized protocols were associated with the then-popular one-token-one-vote voting mechanisms. A one-token-one-vote design allocates more power to token holders who have a significant share of the total supply of a given token.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs* (2021), Governance, page 18

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20A%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organization%20%28DAO%29%20of%20DAOs.pdf

**Failure mode.** Token plutocracy  (family: plutocratic-capture)

**Topics.** tokenomics, governance-design

**Keywords.** one-token-one-vote, plutocracy, voting-power, protocol-governance

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-030
- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-021
- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808873-039
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-028

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.