# kaal:claim:3799320-031

**Claim.** Paying members indirectly, through a fungible stable salary proportional to non fungible reputation, removes corruptive elements and makes the governance design more attack resistant and more stable over the long run.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- salary paid in proportion to non fungible reputation scores

**Source quote.**

> The indirect economic effects remove corruptive elements and make the governance design more attack-resistant and stable in the long run.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs* (2021), Reputation-Based Internal Governance, page 20

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20A%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organization%20%28DAO%29%20of%20DAOs.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, consensus-and-security, tokenomics, reputation

**Keywords.** indirect-incentives, attack-resistance, stable-token, reputation-salary

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3652481-036
- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3441904-038

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.