# kaal:claim:3799320-035

**Claim.** Charging an admission fee disincentivizes betrayal and defection, because the sunk cost of joining makes cheating expensive when rejoining would also be expensive even under anonymity.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- members who can be blacklisted
- anonymous membership

**Source quote.**

> The DAO of DAOs disincentivizes betrayal and defection by charging an admission fee to become a DAO of DAOs member. Given the sunk cost of joining the DAO of DAOs, it is more expensive for prospective members to cheat because it would be expensive to rejoin even if members could be anonymous.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs* (2021), Game-theoretical Design, page 22

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20A%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organization%20%28DAO%29%20of%20DAOs.pdf

**Topics.** economics

**Keywords.** admission-fee, sunk-cost, defection, game-theory

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3981021-032

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.