# kaal:claim:3799320-037

**Claim.** In the DAO of DAOs, algorithms can exclude cheating members from market access, so punishment becomes automated and therefore credible, and free riding in policing is at least partially eliminated by automation.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- algorithmic contract allocation conditioned on reputation

**Source quote.**

> By contrast, in the DAO of DAOs, algorithms can be written which exclude DAO of DAOs members who cheat from having access to their market. Punishment for cheating becomes automated and therefore credible. Free riding in policing can at least partially be eliminated by automation.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs* (2021), Policing and Compliance, page 23

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, A Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) of DAOs (2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799320

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `c3dff852f2d3f04718c829a24189309a7db4d92d84f6045d3d4f562d87c03e63` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202021%20-%20A%20Decentralized%20Autonomous%20Organization%20%28DAO%29%20of%20DAOs.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** automated-punishment, credible-threat, free-riding, policing

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